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First Amendment Law Review
FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES FOR THE INTERNET
Dawn Carla Nunziatoa1
INTRODUCTION
In May 2014, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), on the ropes from two adverse D.C. Circuit decisions,1
proposed the latest in a series of regulations of broadband providers--the entities that serve as the gatekeepers for all content,
applications, and services on the Internet.2 While in recent years the FCC has sought to regulate broadband providers to
impose on them the duty not to discriminate against any of the traffic flowing through their pipes, in these latest Proposed
Rules--in response to the recent D.C. Circuit decision Verizon v. FCC3--the FCC has sought to enable broadband providers to
discriminate in favor of or against certain content.4 These latest Proposed Rules are inconsistent with First Amendment
values. Over the past two decades, the Internet has evolved into a vast public forum for expression and into “the most
participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country--and indeed the world--has yet seen.”5 The FCC should implement
strong net neutrality rules by regulating broadband providers as common carriers and should prohibit them from
discriminating in favor of or against any legal content. Doing so would not violate broadband providers’ First Amendment
rights. Rather, it is the absence of strong net neutrality regulations that threatens our preeminent First Amendment values:
facilitating the uninhibited, robust, and wide-open marketplace of ideas; fostering the public debate and deliberation essential
for the task of democratic self-government; and, in the process, protecting speech that is unpopular, disfavored, and less wellfunded.
I. HISTORY OF U.S. REGULATION OF INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS
In the passage and subsequent interpretation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,6 a central issue confronting
policymakers and courts was how, if at all, access and transmission services by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) should be
regulated. If regulated as “telecommunications services”7 under Title II of the Telecommunications Act, then such providers
would be subject to common carriage regulations prohibiting them, among other things, from discriminating against any type
of legal content, applications, or services.8 If regulated instead as “information services,”9 then such providers would not be
subject to common carriage obligations.10 Prior to 2002, ISPs were generally narrowband or dialup and were regulated as
“telecommunications services” under Title II of the Telecommunications Act and subject to common carriage obligations
prohibiting them from discriminating against content and services--just as telephone services historically have been
regulated.11 In 1998, the FCC classified Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) services--broadband furnished over telephone lines--as
“telecommunications services” since, the Commission reasoned, DSL services involved pure transmission technologies and
as such were subject to Title II regulation.12 Four years later, however, when the FCC was called upon to determine whether
to classify cable broadband providers as “telecommunications services” subject to common carriage/nondiscrimination
obligations, the FCC chose to classify cable broadband providers as “information services” and hence exempt from common
carriage/nondiscrimination requirements.13 This action was subsequently upheld by the United States Supreme Court in its
Brand X decision in 2005.14 That same year, the FCC removed common carriage/nondiscrimination obligations from all other
types of broadband providers as well.15 At the time it did so, the FCC issued an “Internet Policy Statement” that embodied
certain net neutrality principles, although of dubious legal effect and enforceability.16
Meanwhile, in 2007, Comcast, one of the largest broadband providers in the United States, secretly degraded legal peer-topeer file sharing traffic.17 Comcast’s actions, once discovered, prompted the FCC to issue an order censuring Comcast for
violating the FCC’s 2005 Internet Policy Statement, which provided in part that “consumers are entitled to access the lawful
Internet content of their choice. . . . [and] to run applications and use services of their choice.”18 In Comcast v. FCC, the D.C.
Circuit, in reviewing the FCC’s censure of Comcast, held in 2010 that the FCC lacked authority to enforce its Internet Policy
Statement.19 The court held that, since the FCC had classified cable ISPs as “information services” instead of as
“telecommunications services,” the FCC had essentially waived its jurisdiction over matters involving net neutrality and net
discrimination.20
In response to the decision in Comcast v. FCC, the FCC sought to re-assert its authority to implement and enforce net

neutrality regulations and issued its 2010 Open Internet Order.21 The FCC’s 2010 Open Internet Order claimed authority to
impose net neutrality regulations under Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act, which provides that the FCC “shall
encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans” by
using “measures that promote competition in the local telecommunications market” or “other regulating methods that remove
barriers to infrastructure investment” and that the FCC “shall take immediate action to accelerate deployment,” if necessary.22
In its 2010 Open Internet Order, the FCC found that broadband providers potentially face a variety of incentives to reduce the
openness of the Internet.23 The Commission observed that some broadband providers have an incentive to block or
disadvantage edge providers to benefit their own or affiliated offerings at the expense of unaffiliated offerings.24 The FCC
found that reducing such openness would constitute “barriers to infrastructure investment,” which the net neutrality
safeguards in its 2010 Open Internet Order would remove.25 The FCC found further that market discipline alone could not
effectively check such behavior, given the current market power of broadband providers (in which 70% of the U.S.
population has only 2 choices, while 20% has one choice, of broadband providers).26
Accordingly, in its 2010 Open Internet Order, the FCC set forth the following mandates for broadband providers: (1) “Fixed
broadband providers” (cable, DSL) were subject to a no blocking rule and a no unreasonable discrimination rule, as well as a
rule of transparency in network management. The no blocking rule prohibited fixed broadband providers from blocking any
lawful content, applications, or services. The no unreasonable discrimination rule prohibited them from engaging in
unreasonable discrimination in handling network traffic. The transparency rule required them to publicly disclose accurate
information regarding their network management practices, performance, and commercial terms of service.27 (2) “Mobile
broadband providers” were subject to a narrower no blocking rule and a rule of transparency in network management, and
they were not subject to a no unreasonable discrimination rule. The no blocking rule for mobile broadband providers only
prohibited them from blocking access to lawful websites or applications that compete with their own voice or video
telephony services. The transparency rule required them (like fixed broadband providers) to publicly disclose accurate
information regarding their network management practices, performance, and commercial terms of service.28
Broadband provider Verizon challenged the FCC’s 2010 Open Internet Order, claiming inter alia that the FCC was without
authority to enact such rules, that the FCC’s asserted jurisdiction under Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act was
invalid, and that the FCC gave up its authority to enact such regulation when it classified broadband providers as
“information services” back in 2002 instead of as “telecommunications services” subject to common
carriage/nondiscrimination obligations.29 Verizon also claimed that the 2010 Open Internet Order violated broadband
providers’ First Amendment rights. It argued that the First Amendment protects those who transmit the speech of others and
who exercise editorial discretion in selecting which speech to transmit. Verizon claimed that although broadband providers
generally allow all content to be transmitted, they nonetheless possess the editorial discretion not to do so. Because the 2010
Open Internet Order stripped providers of control over which speech they transmit and how they transmit it, and compelled
the carriage of others’ speech on a nondiscriminatory basis, Verizon argued, the order violates providers’ First Amendment
rights.30
In January 2014, the D.C. Circuit struck down portions of the FCC’s 2010 Open Internet Order.31 It determined that the no
blocking rule and the no unreasonable discrimination rules were invalid, while the transparency rules were valid.32 The court
determined that the FCC did not have the authority to impose the no blocking or no unreasonable discrimination rules on
broadband providers without classifying them as telecommunications services subject to common carriage obligations under
Title II of the Telecommunications Act.33 Since the FCC had previously classified broadband providers as “information
services” and not “telecommunications services,” broadband providers could not be regulated in a manner that essentially
subjected them to common carriage regulation.34 Therefore, the FCC’s 2010 Open Internet Order’s no blocking and
nondiscrimination mandates, which could only be applied to common carriers, could not be applied to broadband providers.35
The court, however, upheld the transparency rules, which it found were not contingent upon providers being classified as
common carriers.36 Additionally, the court recognized that Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act vests the FCC with
affirmative authority to enact measures encouraging the deployment of broadband infrastructure.37 It further agreed with the
FCC that broadband providers represent a threat to Internet openness and could hinder future Internet development without
rules similar to those in the Open Internet Order.38 The court then suggested changes to the FCC’s regulations that would
render them more likely to be upheld.39
II. THE FCC’S MAY 2014 PROPOSED RULES
On May 15, 2014, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in an effort to regulate broadband providers in a manner
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that would be upheld by the courts.40 In doing so, the Commission sought to adhere closely to the guidance provided by the
D.C. Circuit in its decisions striking down the FCC’s earlier efforts. These Proposed Rules include: (1) a strengthened
Transparency Rule, (2) a No Blocking Rule, and (3) a No Commercially Unreasonable Practices Rule. (1) The strengthened
Transparency Rule requires broadband providers to publicly disclose accurate information regarding their network
management practices, performance, and commercial terms of service.41 (2) The No Blocking Rule prohibits (a) fixed
broadband providers from outright blocking lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices, subject to
reasonable network management and (b) mobile broadband providers from blocking access to lawful websites and from
blocking applications that compete with the provider’s voice or video telephony services, both subject to reasonable network
management.42 This No Blocking Rule is similar to the 2010 Open Internet Order but uses a different legal rationale. (3) The
No Commercially Unreasonable Practices Rule, in lieu of the earlier Non-Discrimination Rule enables broadband providers
to negotiate with edge providers to allow them to enter into paid prioritization deals for content, apps, and services.43 This
Rule applies only to fixed broadband providers and prohibits them from engaging in commercially unreasonable practices
(with the proviso that reasonable network management shall not constitute a commercially unreasonable practice).44 Under
this Rule (which relies upon Section 706 as its jurisdictional authority45), broadband providers would be prohibited from
engaging in “commercially unreasonable” practices, as opposed to being prohibited from engaging in “unreasonable
discrimination,” as they were under the 2010 Open Internet Order.46 The FCC has indicated that it would determine what
constitutes a commercially unreasonable practice on a case-by-case basis, relying on a “totality of the circumstances” test.47
The D.C. Circuit has indicated that the “commercial reasonableness” standard provides sufficient flexibility for providers to
negotiate deals-- including pay-for-priority deals-- on individualized terms and therefore was not equivalent to a common
carriage regime.48 Thus, the proposed No Commercially Unreasonable Practices Rule governing broadband providers would
allow broadband providers to engage in individualized negotiations with edge providers--including content providers-through which broadband providers would be able to prioritize certain content and disfavor other content, creating “fast
lanes” for prioritized content and “slow lanes” for all other content. Allowing for prioritization of some content and
disfavoring other content is inconsistent with our preeminent First Amendment values, as I explain below.
In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the FCC also seeks comments on whether the imposition of strong net neutrality
rules that prohibit broadband providers from discriminating against or blocking legal content would violate broadband
providers’ First Amendment rights.49 Strong net neutrality rules would not violate the First Amendment rights of broadband
providers, as I discuss below. Rather, it is the absence of strong net neutrality regulations that threatens our preeminent First
Amendment values.
III. THE FCC’S PROPOSED RULES FAIL TO PROTECT OUR PREEMINENT FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES
ON THE INTERNET
A. First Amendment Values: Enabling the Marketplace of Ideas, Facilitating Democratic Self-Government, and
Protecting Disfavored Speech
Since Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s exposition of the philosophical basis of the First Amendment in Abrams v. United
States and other early twentieth century decisions, the Supreme Court’s free speech jurisprudence has increasingly been
grounded in protection for the open marketplace for speech--a marketplace that allows for the free trade in ideas--no matter
how unpopular the speakers or the speech and regardless of whether the speaker has secured the support of the powers that be
or is speaking in opposition to such powers.50 Through its First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has ensured
that the marketplace of ideas is not distorted as a result of discrimination for or against particular speakers, subjects,
viewpoints, or content. The Court has been quick to strike down regulations that favor or disfavor the speech of a particular
speaker or subject, as well as regulations that favor or disfavor particular viewpoints or content, because such regulations
would distort the marketplace of ideas. Although critics have argued that a real marketplace of ideas has never truly existed in
real space because of the dominance of certain speakers in mass media and because of high barriers to entry in real space
forums for expression,51 in the context of the Internet, these criticisms hold far less traction. Rather, the Internet has the true
potential to be the paradigm marketplace of ideas.
At the same time that it has adopted the Holmesian marketplace of ideas as a foundational First Amendment organizing
principle, the Supreme Court has also embraced a democratic self-governance model of the First Amendment, embracing the
theory that free speech is necessary because open discussion and debate on matters affecting the public is essential to our task
of democratic self-government. As Alexander Meiklejohn explained, in order for the people to have the opportunity of
becoming an informed electorate, they need to be able to discuss and debate freely in a manner that is “uninhibited, robust,
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and wide-open” on matters of public and societal importance and to access the speech of others on such subjects.52 In
Meiklejohn’s words, “[The principle of the freedom of speech] is a deduction from the basic American agreement that public
issues shall be decided by universal suffrage.”53 When speech is regulated in such a way that favors or disfavors certain
speakers or viewpoints, this “[mutilates] the thinking process of the community” by tipping the scale in favor of one side of
the debate and disserves these goals of democratic self-government.54 The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of
striking down regulations that discriminate on the basis of content or viewpoint because such regulations distort the public
debate. To facilitate the First Amendment value of enabling democratic self-government, the Court has been careful to
protect the public’s access to speech from a multiplicity of diverse and antagonistic sources, free from discrimination on the
basis of content, viewpoint, speaker, or subject matter.55 As the Court explained in Turner Broadcast Systems v. FCC,56
“assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order,
for it promotes values central to the First Amendment.”57 Indeed, it has long been a basic tenet of national communications
policy that “the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare
of the public.”58 The Court in particular has looked with skepticism on the wielding of private power exercised by gatekeepers
of speech that would limit the public’s access to a multiplicity of sources of information, observing that, “the potential for
abuse of this private power over a central avenue of communication cannot be overlooked.”59 Indeed, in cases involving
gatekeeper control by cable network operators, the Court has recognized the importance for First Amendment purposes of the
government’s “taking steps to ensure that private interests [do] not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway of
communication, the free flow of information and ideas.”60 And, just as cable network operators exercise gatekeeper power in
the television market, so too do broadband providers exercise gatekeeper power over Internet access and transmission for
anyone wishing to reach their subscribers, as the D.C. Circuit recently recognized.61 Such gatekeeper power should also be
held in check when it threatens the public’s access to information from diverse and antagonistic sources, access which is
necessary to facilitate democratic self-government.62
Finally, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the protection of unpopular, disfavored, or less well-funded speech against
discrimination is a preeminent First Amendment value, and one that is integral to both facilitating the marketplace of ideas
and enabling the speech necessary for democratic self-government. The marketplace model itself ensures that all speech,
even speech that we “loathe,” should have its chance in the marketplace.63 The Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence has
emphasized the importance of protecting unpopular speech against the popular will when the powers that be act to censor,
financially burden, or discriminate against unpopular speech. First Amendment values require that speech not be subject to
discriminatory treatment simply because “the overwhelming majority of people might find [it] distasteful or discomforting.”64
Rather, the unpopularity of the speech is the very reason “for according it constitutional protection.”65 As Justice Anthony
Kennedy has explained, “the creation of standards and adherence to them, even when it means affording protection to speech
unpopular or distasteful, is the central achievement of our First Amendment jurisprudence.”66 Further, as the Court has
explained, a law “is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers
because of the content of their speech.”67 This First Amendment value according protection to unpopular or disfavored speech
extends to the protection of less well-funded speech. The Supreme Court’s public forum jurisprudence in particular has
emphasized the importance of allowing for meaningful avenues of communication for poorly funded causes and speakers,
who may not have the means of paying for the expression of their message if not for the availability of public forums for
speech.68 Thus, a preeminent First Amendment value is the protection of unpopular, disfavored, and less well-funded speech
against financial or other types of discrimination--and the provision of meaningful forums for expression for such speech.
B. The Internet Fulfills the First Amendment’s Promise of Enabling Meaningful Forums for Free Expression
The Internet today is as much a public forum for expression as any other medium ever known or invented. Courts have
recognized this, characterizing the Internet as “the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country - and
indeed the world - has yet seen.”69 The Supreme Court has recognized that the Internet is a forum where any speaker “can
become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.”70 As such, the Internet comes closer
to delivering on the First Amendment’s promise of enabling meaningful forums for free expression than any other space or
forum ever known or invented.
Real space forums for expression are imperfect but the Internet isn’t-- yet. While some mediums for expression in real space
have suffered from high barriers to entry and control by gatekeepers (like cable and broadcast) or by dominance by a handful
of well-funded speakers (like major newspapers), the Internet has come very close to fulfilling the First Amendment’s
promise of being a truly democratic, open, and accessible medium of expression--one that hasn’t allowed for discrimination
on the basis of content, viewpoint, or speaker identity. Access to the Internet until now has operated much like access to a
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public forum for expression, like the ability enjoyed by every citizen to speak freely in a public park or on a public street or
sidewalk-- without fear of discrimination on the basis of the content or viewpoint of her speech or on the basis of her identity.
The courts, Congress, and even the FCC in the past have worked to advance a vision and a reality of the Internet that directly
embodies our First Amendment values--an open Internet that fosters a vast, democratic marketplace for speech with low
barriers to entry; a vibrant Internet that is “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”; and an nondiscriminatory Internet that
protects and facilitates speech that is disfavored, unpopular, or less well-funded.71
C. The FCC’s Proposed Rules, by Allowing Broadband Providers to Discriminate Against Content, Are Inconsistent With
First Amendment Values
The FCC’s proposed regulation of the Internet to allow the Internet’s gatekeepers to favor some content--either their own or
affiliated content, or third party content upon payment of a fee-- and to disfavor other content is inconsistent with our
preeminent First Amendment values.72
Through the no-commercially-unreasonable-practices provision, the Proposed Rules allow for broadband providers to
prioritize some content (to provide fast lane treatment for some content over others), including prioritization of the broadband
provider’s own and affiliated content and the paid prioritization of other edge providers’ content.73 Although the Proposed
Rules prohibit outright blocking (censorship) of content,74 the Rules allow for prioritization of some content (fast lane
treatment) and corresponding degradation of other content (slow lane treatment).75 Even though such treatment is not outright
censorship, it is nonetheless inconsistent with First Amendment values. Degradation of transmission of content (slow lane
treatment), especially latency-sensitive content like video, is the practical equivalent of blocking or censoring such content
for Internet users. The average Internet user is intolerant of even miniscule delays in the transmission of content. Internet
users are quick to click away if anything takes too long, even by fractions of a second.76 Four out of five Internet users will
click away if a video stalls while loading.77 Thus, slow lane treatment for Internet content is the practical equivalent of
blocking such content, given the realities of Internet users’ experience.
Further, the Proposed Rules do not even require that broadband providers offer the same prioritization arrangements to all
comers, as does the United States Postal Service or carriers like UPS, which offer fast lanes to any and all who can afford to
pay.78 Allowing broadband providers the discretion to pick and choose favorites for preferential fast lane treatment will
operate to disadvantage less well-financed, disfavored, and unpopular content. It will also allow for and result in
discrimination on the basis of viewpoint and content by broadband providers, which is inconsistent with First Amendment
values.
Allowing for Internet gatekeepers to prioritize some content and disfavor other content is inimical to the marketplace of ideas
because such prioritization results in the skewing and distortion of the marketplace of ideas. For example, the Proposed Rules
would permit Verizon to allow for paid prioritization/fast lane treatment for Fox News video content, while not according
paid prioritization/fast lane treatment for Al Jazeera News video content, resulting in discrimination on the basis of content or
viewpoint and skewing the marketplace of ideas. Burdening speech or discriminating against speech within a forum like the
Internet because of the speech’s unpopularity is inconsistent with our First Amendment values.79 The Supreme Court has held
that “speech cannot be . . . burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned, [because of its unpopularity].”80
Further, under the Proposed Rules, broadband providers would be allowed to charge a premium for fast lane service that less
well-financed content providers, including noncommercial and nonprofit organizations, will not be able to afford.81 For
example, Verizon may choose to allow for paid prioritization for CBS’s video content while NPR may not be able to afford
to pay the premium Verizon requires for paid prioritization. Allowing for fast lane treatment of some content while relegating
other content to slow lane treatment is also inconsistent with the notion of equal treatment of speakers within a public forum
for expression. Such a regime would be inconsistent with the First Amendment value of protecting unpopular, disfavored, or
less well-funded speech--the “central achievement of our First Amendment jurisprudence.”82 In short, under the Proposed
Rules, broadband providers have the incentive to engage in precisely the sort of content-based, viewpoint-based, and subjectmatter based regulations of speech that are antithetical to our pre-eminent First Amendment values.
Finally, the Proposed Rules’ “minimum level of access” requirement is not sufficient to protect First Amendment values on
the Internet.83 The reason is more fundamental than the concerns about administrability84 and usability85 that some critics have
asserted. The more fundamental problem is that any concept of threshold (e.g., minimum level) is problematic because
unpopular, disfavored, or less well-funded speech will likely suffer from the disparity necessarily introduced by the threshold
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concept. Providers will inevitably maintain--and profit from--the disparity in performance, such that the fast(er) lane, which
exceeds the minimum level of access, will remain meaningful as a relative concept. From an economic perspective, the
disparity allows for competition and financial gain. From a First Amendment perspective, the disparity risks discrimination.
History urges caution regarding disparities in matters of fundamental rights like free speech interests, and suggests that from
disparity it is but a short distance to discrimination.86 A separate and unequal slow lane should justifiably raise concerns about
First Amendment (and other constitutional) values on the Internet.
D. If Unregulated, Broadband Providers Will Likely Discriminate Against Some Content and In Favor of Other Content
The possibility that broadband providers, if given the opportunity, will discriminate against expression on the basis of its
viewpoint or content is not merely theoretical. Similar types of discrimination have already occurred in related contexts.
Consider the actions of Verizon Wireless in restricting the ability of a pro-choice organization to transmit SMS messages. In
2007, Verizon Wireless refused to allow NARAL Pro-Choice America to transmit such messages to NARAL’s own members.
Asserting its authority to block messages from any group that seeks to “distribute content that, in [Verizon’s] discretion, may
be seen as controversial or unsavory to any of our users,” Verizon initially refused to facilitate the transmission of such
messages to certain Verizon customers--even when those users had expressly signed up to receive NARAL’s messages. In
that case, Verizon ultimately bowed to public pressure (after it was subject to criticism in a front page article in the New York
Times) and reversed course, all the while maintaining that it enjoyed the discretion to determine in the future which text
messages to facilitate and which to prohibit.87 Although the mainstream media in that case imposed a sufficient check on
Verizon Wireless’s content and viewpoint discrimination, the fact remains that wireless and broadband providers have an
incentive to discriminate against content that is disfavored, poorly funded, or unpopular.
T-Mobile’s censorship of SMS messages connected to legal medical marijuana services provides a further example of
discrimination against such controversial or unpopular content. In September 2010, T-Mobile blocked all messages going to
or coming from EZ Texting, a marketing company that enables its clients to provide short code text messaging. T-Mobile did
so because EZ Texting had contracted with the Legal Marijuana Dispensary, a web service that provides information
regarding access to medical marijuana in states where it is legal. T-Mobile found Legal Marijuana Dispensary content to be
“objectionable” and sought to block all text messages to or from intermediary EZ Texting--regardless of whether the
messages involved the Legal Marijuana Dispensary--even after EZ Texting agreed to drop Legal Marijuana Dispensary as a
client. In EZ Texting’s lawsuit, T-Mobile asserted that it had the discretion to refuse to facilitate content of which it did not
approve.88
Discrimination on the basis of content, viewpoint, subject matter, or speaker identity within a public forum like the Internet
by those who hold the reins of power is inconsistent with First Amendment values. Because of the importance of protecting
an open marketplace of ideas and enabling public discussion and debate on matters of public importance, allowing broadband
providers to enter into paid prioritization deals with favored content providers and degrading the transmission of disfavored,
poorly funded, or unpopular content will not adequately protect our preeminent First Amendment values. To accord
meaningful protection for such values, broadband providers-- as gatekeepers responsible for the free flow of information on
“the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country--and indeed the world--has yet seen”89--should be
subject to strong net neutrality rules that prohibit discrimination in favor of or against any legal content.
E. The FCC Should Regulate Broadband Providers as Common Carriers
The FCC should correct the mistake it made in 2002 when it declined to classify broadband providers as
“telecommunications services” subject to common carriage obligations under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. As
President Obama has recently argued90 the FCC should reclassify broadband providers as telecommunications services
subject to common carriage obligations to remedy once and for all the problems that it wrought in 2002 by declining to so
regulate broadband providers.
The common carriage doctrine imposes obligations on private speech conduits to facilitate the expression of others and
prohibits these conduits from exercising the discretion to determine which communications to facilitate and which to censor.
Since the beginning of the modern communications era in the 1930s, the FCC has imposed obligations on providers of
interstate communications services (like telephone and telegraph companies) to facilitate the transmission of all legal content.
The United States Postal Service has also been regulated as a common carrier that is required to facilitate the transmission of
6

all legal content and is prohibited from discriminating against such content.91 As Ithiel de Sola Pool explains:
[T]he law of common carriage protects ordinary citizens in their right to communicate. . . .[This doctrine] rests
on the . . . assumption that, in the absence of regulation, the carrier will have enough monopoly power to deny
citizens the right to communicate. The rules against discrimination are designed to ensure access to the means
of communication . . . . [T]his . . . element of civil liberty is central to [the law of common carriage].92

The common carriage status of communications providers benefits members of the public by granting them access to
communications conduits under a nondiscrimination principle. As Jerome Barron explains, individuals who rely on common
carriers to facilitate their communications “benefit from the democratic egalitarianism which characterizes the nondiscriminatory access principle associated with common carrier law.”93
The common carriage doctrine in the United States has its roots in the early English law of common carriage,94 under which
private entities that served the public in the performance of important public functions were charged with certain obligations.
At English common law, the common carriage doctrine was a vehicle for imposing obligations on private entities that
performed important functions for the benefit of the public, similar to those assumed by the government itself.95 By imposing
obligations on certain private entities to facilitate the transport and, ultimately, the communications of others, the common
carriage doctrine rejected the principle that private entities may regulate transportation and communication however they
choose, with their conduct held in check by the market only.
In the mid-1880s, Congress began to regulate American telegraph companies in a manner akin to common carriers. Even
though telegraph companies (like broadband provides today) did not enjoy monopoly power within their market, Congress
conditioned certain valuable privileges for telegraph companies on their agreement to be subject to common carriage
obligations.96 In 1893, the Supreme Court ruled that, like common carriers, telegraph companies were required to provide
service without discrimination.97 Two decades later, in the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, Congress extended common carrier
obligations to a host of early telecommunications providers, including telegraph, telephone, and cable providers.98
Congress overhauled the regulation of telecommunications providers in the Communications Act of 1934,99 which charged
the newly-created Federal Communications Commission with regulatory authority over telecommunications providers
(telegraph and telephone companies), regardless of whether they enjoyed monopoly power, and imposed additional common
carriage regulations on such providers.100 Under the 1934 Act, common carriers are charged with the obligation to serve as
transparent conduits for all (legal) content originated by others.101 The role of a common carrier, like the telephone company,
is neither to generate content nor to make editorial or qualitative decisions regarding which content to carry and which to
censor.102 Common carriers are prohibited from “mak[ing] individualized decisions, in particular cases, whether and on what
terms to deal,”103 and do not enjoy independent First Amendment rights to exercise editorial discretion.104 Unlike newspaper
publishers, for example, common carriers are not entitled to engage in editorial discretion to determine which content to
transmit and which to censor.105 The content transmitted by a common carrier--unlike that transmitted by a newspaper
publisher--is not subject to editorial control or discretion.106 As such, common carriers are distinct from publishers or other
editors who enjoy their own First Amendment rights to exercise editorial discretion in their selection and exclusion of
content.107
Throughout the mid-twentieth century, common carriage/nondiscrimination obligations were applied to traditional conduits
of communication like telephone companies.108 In the early 1970s, the FCC began to consider whether and to what extent to
impose common carriage obligations on computer-assisted processes and services.109 In a series of “Computer Inquiries,” the
FCC essentially created two categories of computer-assisted communications services: basic services and enhanced
services.110 “Basic” (later, “telecommunications”) services, like telephone and facsimile services, were those that offered
straightforward transmission services, and those offering such services were regulated as common carriers and made subject
to the requirement that they not discriminate on the basis of content.111 “Enhanced” (later, “information” services) were those
in which computer processing applications were implemented to act on a subscriber’s information, and providers of such
services were exempt from common carriage/nondiscrimination requirements.112
In 1996, in its passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress revisited the categorization of services subject to
common carriage regulation that was established under the Computer Inquiries.113 Under the 1996 Act, “telecommunications”
services were made subject to common carriage regulation (replacing the category of “basic services”), while “information
services” were exempted from common carriage regulation (replacing the formerly exempt category of “enhanced
7

services”).114 The Act maintained significant common carrier obligations on providers of “telecommunications services,”
while leaving “information services” providers subject to far less regulation.115
The Act defined “telecommunications service” as “the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public . . .
regardless of the facilities used.”116 The FCC has ruled that, despite the changes in nomenclature, the basic distinctions
between these two categories remain the same. The 1996 Act changed the rights and responsibilities of common carriers by
specifying more precisely the obligations that common carriers must assume.117 While the Act creates a presumption that
telecommunications carriers will be treated as common carriers, it authorized the FCC to forbear from enforcing any
provision of the Act if the FCC determines that such enforcement is unnecessary to guard against discrimination, to ensure
just and reasonable services, to safeguard consumers, or to serve the public interest.118 Title II of the Communications Act sets
forth a complex regulatory regime imposed upon common carriers, but the essential duty imposed upon common carriers is
the duty not to discriminate in the offering of their services, and in particular, not to discriminate against certain types of
content in serving as conduits for the transmission of such content.
In the passage and interpretation of the Telecommunications Act, a central issue confronting policymakers and courts was
how, if at all, the provision of Internet access by cable providers (and the provision of broadband Internet access more
generally) should be regulated. If regulated as “telecommunications services,” then providers of broadband Internet access
would be subject to common carriage regulation prohibiting them, among other things, from discriminating against any type
of legal content (and requiring them to allow interconnection by unaffiliated ISPs).119 If regulated instead as providing only
“information services,” then providers of broadband Internet access would be free of such common carriage obligations.
In its 2002 “Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities”120 (hereinafter
“Declaratory Ruling”), the FCC concluded that cable modem service was an “information service” with “no separate offering
of telecommunications service,”121 the latter of which would have rendered such services subject to common carriage
obligations. The Commission ruled that the provision of cable broadband service does not contain a separate
telecommunications service because the transmission of the data is “part and parcel” of that service, and is integral to its
capabilities.122 As an “information service” with “no separate offering of telecommunications service,” cable operators’
provision of broadband Internet access was exempted from the common carrier regulations of Title II of the Communications
Act. This ruling by the FCC is significant in that it reverses course on the history of the Commission’s regulation of
telecommunications services. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the FCC formulated and implemented a workable distinction
between the underlying common carrier network, on the one hand, and the services and information made available over that
network, on the other. The 2002 Declaratory Ruling collapsed this crucial distinction and for the first time permitted network
operators to discriminate against the content they were charged with transmitting over their networks.
The decision by the FCC to exempt cable broadband from common carriage obligations was challenged by unaffiliated ISPs
who asserted the right to interconnect with cable providers’ pipelines and sought a ruling that cable broadband should be
regulated as the provision of a telecommunications service subject to common carriage obligations. In a case that former FCC
Commissioner Michael Copps described as involving nothing less than the “future of the Internet,”123 the Supreme Court in
Brand X determined that the FCC enjoyed the discretion to interpret the Telecommunications Act as it had done in its
Declaratory Ruling to decline to subject cable operators’ provision of broadband Internet access--or the provision of any
other type of broadband Internet access--to nondiscrimination/common carriage obligations. Rather, as providers of
“information services,” they are subject to less stringent regulation under the Act under the FCC’s Title I “ancillary
authority,” under which the FCC enjoys the authority to impose requirements that are “reasonably ancillary to existing
Commission Statutory authority.”124 The Commission found that cable broadband providers offer “a single, integrated service
that enables the subscriber to utilize Internet access service . . . and to realize the benefits of a comprehensive service
offering,”125 and concluded that the integrated service provided was an “information service,” without a separate component
“telecommunications service” that would render the providers subject to common carriage regulation. The FCC grounded its
decision, in part, on the policy judgment that “broadband service should exist in a minimal regulatory environment that
promotes investment and innovation in a competitive market.”126
The Supreme Court’s decision to allow the FCC the discretion to roll back common carriage obligations on cable and other
broadband providers heralded a substantial blow for free speech on the Internet. After the Brand X decision, the FCC
subsequently removed common carriage regulations from every other type of broadband provider. One month after the Brand
X decision was handed down, the FCC ruled that DSL, like cable broadband, was also an “information service,” and that
therefore telephone companies’ provision of broadband Internet access via DSL would no longer be subject to common
carriage requirements.127 The FCC subsequently ruled that all other types of broadband are likewise exempt from common
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carriage/nondiscrimination regulations.128 Accordingly, decisions about what speech to censor and what speech to facilitate
were left to the discretion of the companies providing broadband Internet access.
The FCC’s fundamental misstep in removing common carriage, nondiscrimination obligations from broadband providers
(later approved by the Supreme Court in Brand X) was its determination that cable operators providing broadband Internet
access were not-- in whole or in part--offering “telecommunications services” and were therefore not subject to regulation as
common carriers or pure communications conduits.129 The Commission erred by prioritizing the very limited editorial role of
cable broadband providers over the much weightier free speech interests of members of the public who necessarily rely on
broadband providers to serve as conduits for their expression.
In regulating broadband providers, Congress and the FCC should be guided by the principle underlying modern
communications law that liberal democracies require a well-informed citizenry, which in turn requires that citizens enjoy the
freedom to communicate and to access communications conduits on a nondiscriminatory basis. The same principles that
justify regulating telephone and telegraph operators and the postal service as common carriers subject to nondiscrimination
requirements--in order to “protect ordinary citizens in their right to communicate”130--are valid today with regard to Internet
communications.
The recent regulatory state of affairs in the Internet context, which allows broadband providers to discriminate against
whatever content or applications they choose for whatever reasons they choose, is inconsistent with the historical progression
of according individuals protection in their freedom to communicate. Broadband providers should be subject to regulation as
“telecommunications services” requiring them to assume at least the nondiscrimination obligations that historically have been
imposed upon common carriers--the duty to facilitate and transmit in a nondiscriminatory manner any and all legal content.
F. Strong Net Neutrality Regulation Prohibiting Broadband Providers from Blocking or Discriminating Against Legal
Content Would Not Infringe Providers’ First Amendment Rights
In its May 2014 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the FCC requested comment on whether the imposition of strong net
neutrality rules-- prohibiting broadband providers from discriminating in favor of or against legal content--would violate
broadband providers’ First Amendment rights.131 Such rules would not violate broadband providers’ rights, despite broadband
providers’ repeated arguments to the contrary, as I discuss below.
Broadband providers like Verizon have long argued that they enjoy the First Amendment right to favor or disfavor the
Internet content of their choosing and that nondiscrimination and no-blocking rules would violate their free speech rights.
Even while claiming that they do not actually discriminate against expression and that they in fact allow for the free flow of
all types of content, they claim that their primary role for First Amendment purposes is similar to that of a newspaper editor-that of a selector or editor of the Internet’s content and as a speaker in their own right, not as a conduit for the
communications of others. They characterize their role as such to bolster their right to favor or disfavor the content of their
choosing and to shore up their First Amendment rights under existing precedent. Verizon, for example, claims that its role in
providing broadband access, for First Amendment purposes, is no different than a newspaper publisher’s-- an editor or
selector of content.132 The Supreme Court has held that government interference with newspaper publishers’ discretion, such
as by requiring newspapers to publish content not of their choosing, violates the newspapers’ First Amendment rights.133
Verizon argues that the imposition of non-discrimination and no-blocking rules on broadband providers would present the
same First Amendment concerns that regulation of newspapers has historically created.
Broadband providers’ efforts to cast themselves primarily in the role of speakers or editors in opposing strong net neutrality
regulations misconstrue the realities of broadband Internet access and misinterpret First Amendment case law and policy. In
providing broadband Internet access, broadband providers function for First Amendment purposes as conduits for the speech
of others, not as speakers or editors in their own right. Broadband providers’ primary function is to serve as a conduit or
pipeline for the speech of others. When we analyze where on the First Amendment spectrum-- pure conduit versus pure
editor--broadband providers fall with respect to their provision of broadband access, the functions that broadband providers
serve place them on the conduit end not on the editor end. Accordingly, regulation of their conduit function to protect the free
flow of information would not violate providers’ First Amendment rights.
Even assuming that broadband providers enjoy some minimal First Amendment interest in the conduit functions they
perform, strong net neutrality regulations that prohibit the blocking of and discrimination against legal content would be
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analyzed and upheld by courts as content-neutral regulations of speech that survive intermediate scrutiny. In Turner
Broadcasting Systems v. Federal Communications Commission, cable network operators objected to “must carry” rules
imposed by the FCC that required them to carry certain broadcast programming not of their choosing and that limited their
editorial discretion over the content that could be provided over their cable channels. The Court specifically rejected the
analogy the cable operators sought to draw between their First Amendment rights and those of newspaper publishers and held
that the First Amendment editorial rights of the cable network operators were quite limited.134 The Court distinguished the
amount and type of control that cable network operators exercise over the communications received by their subscribers from
the editorial discretion exercised by newspapers. It held further that, in contrast to a newspaper, a cable operator enjoys
“bottleneck, or gatekeeper, control over most . . . programming that is channeled into the subscriber’s home” and that “simply
by virtue of its ownership of the essential pathway for cable speech, a cable operator can prevent its subscribers from
obtaining access to programming it chooses to exclude.”135 The Court concluded that the FCC enjoyed the power, consistent
with the First Amendment, to “ensure that private interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway of
communication, the free flow of information and ideas.”136
While recognizing that the must carry rules interfered to some extent with the First Amendment rights of cable network
operators, the Court ultimately held in Turner II that these regulations were justified in light of the control that cable
operators exert over the free flow of information and ideas.137 It held that the challenged must carry regulations survived
intermediate scrutiny because they were content-neutral and did not burden more of the cable operators’ speech than
necessary to further the government’s important interests.138 In his concurring opinion in Turner II, Justice Breyer explained
that the must carry regulations served the purpose of advancing the national communications policy of protecting “the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources” and “facilitat[ing] the public discussion and
informed deliberation [that] . . . democratic government presupposes and the First Amendment seeks to achieve.”139 Breyer
concluded that although there were First Amendment interests “on both sides of the equation,” the must carry regulations
struck a reasonable balance between potentially speech-restricting consequences for cable operators and speech-enhancing
consequences for members of the public.140
As in Turner II, the imposition of strong net neutrality regulations on broadband providers prohibiting discrimination in favor
of or against content and prohibiting the blocking of content would be scrutinized as content-neutral regulations that would
survive intermediate scrutiny. The free speech interests of members of the public in having broadband providers serve as
neutral conduits for our communications are even more pressing than in the Turner II context. Like the regulations at issue in
Turner II, but to an even greater extent, strong net neutrality regulations advance the substantial government interest of
protecting the public’s meaningful access to the free flow of information and ideas--including meaningful access to
disfavored, poorly funded, and unpopular expression. Even if broadband providers were able to convince a court that their
First Amendment interests were implicated by such regulation--and they are implicated far less than cable operators’ interests
in Turner II, if at all--Turner II would dictate the conclusion that such interests were outweighed by the countervailing free
speech interests in promoting broad information dissemination, public discussion, and deliberation. The predominant free
speech interests implicated by strong net neutrality regulations are those of members of the public in nondiscriminatory
access to the expression they seek to send and receive, not those of the broadband providers in providing broadband Internet
access. The public’s free speech interests outweigh whatever minimal interests might be asserted by broadband providers and
therefore strong net neutrality regulation--imposing nondiscrimination and no-blocking rules on broadband providers--would
not violate the First Amendment rights of broadband providers.
IV. CONCLUSION
When the FCC first removed common carriage/ nondiscrimination obligations from broadband providers in 2002, it
abandoned the United States’ long history of regulating telecommunications providers (like telephone and telegraph
providers) to require them not to discriminate against the content they were charged with transmitting. The FCC chose
instead to entrust the protection of Internet users’ free speech interests to the market--and to a highly imperfect market at
that141--one in which most Internet users have no meaningful choice as to broadband provider. Under the FCC’s current
Proposed Rules, broadband providers would be free to prioritize whatever content they choose and to discriminate against
disfavored content. Given the freedom to do so in the past, intermediaries for expression have indeed discriminated against
content in a variety of ways--including against social and political expression and other content that is highly valued within
our constitutional scheme. It should come as no surprise that they would do so. As unregulated market actors, these speech
intermediaries have various incentives to favor some and to discriminate against other content--including content that is
disfavored, poorly funded, unpopular or otherwise conflicts with their own political, economic, or other interests. Allowing
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broadband providers to discriminate in this manner is inconsistent with our First Amendment values. As the Supreme Court
explained in Turner, our nation’s First Amendment values require “the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources.”142 Regulation of powerful speech intermediaries, pursuant to our national communications
policy, is essential to “facilitate the public discussion and informed deliberation, which . . . democratic government
presupposes and the First Amendment seeks to achieve. . . . [A]ssuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of
information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central to the First Amendment.”143
To advance First Amendment values in the Internet age, the FCC should correct once and for all the mistakes it made in 2002
and impose on broadband providers the nondiscrimination and no-blocking obligations that historically have been imposed
on conduits for communication. To fulfill the Internet’s promise of being “the most participatory marketplace of mass speech
that this country--and indeed the world--has yet seen,”144 those who serve as powerful gatekeepers for expression on the
Internet should be regulated consistent with First Amendment values to ensure that they act as good stewards within this
marketplace. The Internet should remain free from discrimination, prioritization, degradation, blocking, or other censorship,
consistent with the First Amendment values that are necessary to facilitate the marketplace of ideas and the public discussion
and informed deliberation that democratic government requires.
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APPENDIX: THE FCC’S PROPOSED RULES
Proposed Rules
Part 8 of Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:
PART 8- PROTECTING AND PROMOTING THE OPEN INTERNET
Sec.
8.1 Purpose.
8.3 Transparency.
8.5 No Blocking.
8.7 No Commercially Unreasonable Practices.
8.9 Other Laws and Considerations.
8.11 Definitions.
§ 8.1 Purpose.
The purpose of this Part is to protect and promote the Internet as an open platform enabling consumer choice, freedom of
expression, end-user control, competition, and the freedom to innovate without permission, and thereby to encourage the
deployment of advanced telecommunications capability and remove barriers to infrastructure investment.
§ 8.3 Transparency.
(a) A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service shall publicly disclose accurate information
regarding the network management practices, performance, and commercial terms of its broadband Internet access services,
in a manner tailored (i) for end users to make informed choices regarding use of such services, (ii) for edge providers to
develop, market, and maintain Internet offerings, and (iii) for the Commission and members of the public to understand how
such person complies with the requirements described in sections 8.5 and 8.7 of this chapter.
(b) In making the disclosures required by this section, a person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service
shall include meaningful information regarding the source, timing, speed, packet loss, and duration of congestion.
(c) In making the disclosures required by this section, a person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service
shall publicly disclose in a timely manner to end users, edge providers, and the Commission when they make changes to their
network practices as well as any instances of blocking, throttling, and pay-for-priority arrangements, or the parameters of
default or “best effort” service as distinct from any priority service.
§ 8.5 No Blocking.
A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not
block lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices, subject to reasonable network management.
A person engaged in the provision of mobile broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall
not block consumers from accessing lawful websites, subject to reasonable network management; nor shall such person block
applications that compete with the provider’s voice or video telephony services, subject to reasonable network management.
§ 8.7 No Commercially Unreasonable Practices.
A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not
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engage in commercially unreasonable practices. Reasonable network management shall not constitute a commercially
unreasonable practice.
§ 8.9 Other Laws and Considerations.
Nothing in this part supersedes any obligation or authorization a provider of broadband Internet access service may have to
address the needs of emergency communications or law enforcement, public safety, or national security authorities,
consistent with or as permitted by applicable law, or limits the provider’s ability to do so.
Nothing in this part prohibits reasonable efforts by a provider of broadband Internet access service to address copyright
infringement or other unlawful activity.
§ 8.11 Definitions.
(a) Block. The failure of a broadband Internet access service to provide an edge provider with a minimum level of access that
is sufficiently robust, fast, and dynamic for effective use by end users and edge providers.
(b) Broadband Internet access service. A mass-market retail service by wire or radio that provides the capability to transmit
data to and receive data from all or substantially all Internet endpoints, including any capabilities that are incidental to and
enable the operation of the communications service, but excluding dial-up Internet access service. This term also
encompasses any service that the Commission finds to be providing a functional equivalent of the service described in the
previous sentence, or that is used to evade the protections set forth in this Part.
(c) Edge Provider. Any individual or entity that provides any content, application, or service over the Internet, and any
individual or entity that provides a device used for accessing any content, application, or service over the Internet.
(d) End User. Any individual or entity that uses a broadband Internet access service.
(e) Fixed broadband Internet access service. A broadband Internet access service that serves end users primarily at fixed
endpoints using stationary equipment. Fixed broadband Internet access service includes fixed wireless services (including
fixed unlicensed wireless services), and fixed satellite services.
(f) Mobile broadband Internet access service. A broadband Internet access service that serves end users primarily using
mobile stations.
(g) Reasonable network management. A network management practice is reasonable if it is appropriate and tailored to
achieving a legitimate network management purpose, taking into account the particular network architecture and technology
of the broadband Internet access service.
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